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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rules 45, 46 and 51 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlining the process for the Court to review a
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. A copy of the Utah Court of Appeals decision in
Carlos Vorher v. Honorable Stephen Henriod, 2011 UT App. 199, is found at Addendum
A. Appellant petitioned this Court through that process and obtained and order from the
Court dated November, 15, 2011, granting his Petition for Writ of Certiorari permitting
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In granting the Petition for Certiorari this Court identified the issue to be addressed
as follows:
I: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying Appellant's request for extraordinary
relief challenging the imposition of a more severe penalty following a de novo trial on
appeal of his justice court guilty plea.
The Supreme Court Order granting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari identifying
the issue is found at Addendum B.
Standard of Review:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IV

This Court has identified the following standard of review for a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals and for the issue presented herein.
"On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its
conclusions of law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^f 10, 82 P.3d
1106.
State v. Spillers, 152 P.3d 315, 2007 UT 13, If 10.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

Amendment V, Constitution of the United States (full text)
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

ALL OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
ARE FOUND AT ADDENDUM C
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
CARLOS VORHER,
Petitioner/Appellant.

OPENING BRIEF

vs.
HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRIOD,

Case No. 20110737

Respondent/Appellee.

(not in custody)

OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE:
This Court granted Mr. Vorher's Petition for Writ of Certiorari specifically
articulating the issue to be addressed on appeal as whether the court of appeals erred in
denying Mr. Vorher's request for extraordinary relief challenging the imposition of a more
severe penalty following a de novo trial on appeal of his justice court guilty plea. The
decision of the court of appeals is found in addendum A. See Order, granting certiorari
review, Addendum B.
1
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
Mr. Vorher was charged initially in the justice court with Voyeurism, a Class B
misdemeanor. With the assistance of his first trial counsel, Mr. Vorher pleaded guilty to a
reduced charge of Disorderly Conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and was sentenced to the
maximum 90 days jail allowed under that charge. He was ordered into custody and then
through new (and his second) trial counsel, he exercised his right to appeal his conviction
to obtain a de novo trial in the district court.
At the district court he chose to try the case and was convicted of the original
voyeurism charge, the Class B misdemeanor. The trial judge, over the objection of
counsel, sentenced Mr. Vorher to 180 days jail, the maximum allowable under the
voyeurism charge. Counsel specifically argued that the Court was required to sentence no
harsher than the sentence the justice court had imposed. Counsel indicated his
preparedness to address case authority for his position. R. 75.
The trial court judge entertained no argument responding that Mr. Vorher appeal his
decision. However, no further appeal is permitted following the de novo trial so Mr.
Vorher petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for extraordinary relief.

DISPOSITION BELOW:
Mr. Vorher urged the court of appeals to vacate the sentencing imposed by the
district court as the 180 days sentence was more harsh and more severe than the 90 day
sentence the justice court had imposed and ordered that he serve. The Court of Appeals
found Mr. Vorher's petition to be properly presented for possible extraordinary relief but
2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

denied his request finding that the district court had neither demonstrated a mistake of law
nor that it abused its discretion. The Utah Court of Appeals decision is reproduced in
Addendum A. Its citation is 2011 UT App 199.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(TAKEN FROM THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS)
On March 18, 20095 at approximately 5:20 a.m., a witness observed an
individual lying on his stomach, on the grass, outside a residence in Tooele, Utah. The
witness believed that individual was peering into a basement window. As the witness
approached the residence in his vehicle, the person (a man) stood up and walked away.
The witness noted the license plate of the man's vehicle and reported the matter to police.
The vehicle was registered to Mr. Vorher.
Tooele City law enforcement responded to the address where the vehicle was
registered and attempted to contact Carlos Vorher, the registered owner. An officer
made contact with Mr. Vorher's wife, who advised that her husband, Carlos, had left for
work approximately 6:00 a.m., but did not know if he had left any earlier. Mr. Vorher
later met with the investigating officer and exercised his right to an attorney and was
released.
Law enforcement also conducted follow up at the residence. The mother there
indicated that her daughter's bedroom is in the basement on the east side of the residence,
the same area the witness had observed the male. She further indicated that her daughter
had been awakened at 5:15 a.m. and would have been dressing and preparing for school
3
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at that time. Law enforcement concluded its investigation and referred the case to the
Tooele City Attorney, who subsequently filed the Class B misdemeanor Voyeurism
charge against Mr. Vorher.
On December 14, 2009, in the Tooele County Justice Court, the Defendant
represented by his first counsel pleaded guilty to Disorderly Conduct, a Class C
misdemeanor. Tooele County Justice Court Judge Pitt sentenced the Defendant to pay a
fine of $ 1,055.00 and to serve 90 days jail allowing him to report to the jail on December
21,2009. R.2.
On December 21, 2009, the Defendant reported to jail but subsequently retained
new counsel who filed an appeal of Mr. Vorher's conviction to the Third District Court.
On December 29, 2009, Mr. Vorher was released from jail and the appeal transferred to
the Third District Court. R. 4-5.
A jury trial with the new trial counsel was held before Judge Henriod on April 23,
2010, and Mr. Vorher was convicted of the Class B Voyeurism charge. R. 61. Judge
Henriod issued a no bail warrant and ordered Mr. Vorher to report to the Tooele County
Jail by 8:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 24, 2010, where he was to be held pending
sentencing on June 1, 2010. R. 62-63.
Defense counsel motioned to reschedule sentencing for an earlier date and was
granted that request. R. 69. The Defendant appeared before Judge Henriod in the Third
District Court for sentencing on May 25, 2010, and was ordered to serve 180 days in jail,
with credit given for time served of 41 days. R. 72.

4
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At sentencing, defense counsel attempted to present the trial court with case law
addressing the issue whether the District Court was able to order a more severe sentence
than what was handed down in the justice court. The Court rejected the argument and
challenged defense counsel to appeal. R. 75. At this point, the following colloquy
occurred:

[Vorher's counsel]: Your Honor, it would be our—
[The district court]: He can serve—
[Vorher's counsel]:—our position that because he was sentenced to 90 days that
the maximum amount this Court can sentence him to is 90 days.
[The district court]: Because he got a deal in the justice court and rejected it and
came back up here on a B, he doesn't get the 90 days. He gets the whole 180 days.
[Vorher's counsel]: I think there's contrary case law, if I can speak to that, your
Honor.
[The district court]: Go ahead and appeal.
R. 75 at 6.
The district court also assessed a fine and surcharge of $ 1,850.00 against Mr.
Vorher which exceeded the amount of the fine imposed by the justice court ($ 1,055.00).
R. 2; 72. Mr. Vorher began service of jail on April 24, 2010, but requested counsel to
initiate a Petition for Extraordinary Relief. R. 62. Four months later, on July 24, 2010,
the appellate court granted counsel's request and issued a stay pending resolution of the
petition. R. 77. Mr. Vorher served over 130 days before his release pending the
decision from the petition.
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The Utah Court of Appeals ultimately denied Mr. Vorher's petition concluding
that the "broad exception" of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(b) controlled and that the
trial court neither abused its discretion nor made a mistake of law. Vorher v. Henriod,
2011 Utah App. 199, t t 9-11. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari followed.
Mr. Vorher is not in custody.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner Carlos Vorher was wrongfully sentenced, in District Court, to a harsher
punishment after appealing a final decision from justice court. The longstanding general
rule based on due process and constitutional and statutory rights to appeal dictate that a
defendant cannot be punished more severely for appealing a conviction from the justice
court obtaining his right to appeal through the district court in the form of a de novo trial.
"[T]he court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different
offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the
portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied." Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 76-3-405(1)
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated that imposing a harsher
punishment after appealing a lower court decision is a violation of due process. North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969). "[Penalizing those who choose to
exercise constitutional rights, would be patently unconstitutional. And the very threat
inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would . . . serve to 'chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights." Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581
(1968)).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court of appeals recognized that justice courts and district courts appellate
processes are different. Nonetheless the court erroneously concluded that the difference
was insignificant enough to mandate that the exception to the rule found in -405(2)(b) did
not apply to justice court cases. The result is to seriously chill the right of Mr. Vorher and
other similarly situated justice court defendants to exercise their right to appeal and enjoy
due process right afforded any defendant charged with committing a crime.

ARGUMENT

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING MR. VORHER'S
REQUEST FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF CHALLENGING THE
IMPOSITION OF A MORE SEVERE PENALTY FOLLOWING A DE NOVO
TRIAL ON APPEAL OF HIS JUSTICE COURT GUILTY PLEA

Our courts have long held that constitutional considerations of due process and
protected rights of appellate review prohibit an accused from being sentenced more harshly
or more severely for exercising his right to appeal.

[D]ue process of law requires that a defendant be freed from the apprehension that
if he appeals his conviction successfully and is then convicted at a second trial the
trial judge can retaliate by giving him an increased sentence. Consequently, the
Court held, the sentence imposed after re-trial cannot be more severe than the
original sentence, unless the reason for the increased sentence, based on
identifiable conduct by the defendant following the original trial, appears in the
record.
State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981)(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969)). This Court then explained that our state's position followed the Pearce
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decision with clarity and emphasis on the constitutional right to appeal. This Court
stated:
In 19735 our Legislature implemented that [Pearce] requirement in a more
stringent fashion that allows for no exceptions. So far as pertinent to this appeal,
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-405 provides that where a conviction has been set aside on
direct review, "the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or
for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the
prior sentence...." In Chess v. Smith, Utah, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (1980), we held
that section 76-3-405 also prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal (Article
VIII, § 9) from being impaired "by imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the
error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence
for having done so."
Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 179 (emphasis added).
Utah justice court defendants are especially entitled to these constitutional
safeguards as they are treated differently in their quest for acquittal than those defendants
who begin their cases in the district court and receive appellate rights through our state's
appellate courts. "[Penalizing those who choose to exercise constitutional rights, would
be patently unconstitutional. And the very threat inherent in the existence of such a
punitive policy would . .. serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights." Id.
(citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
Nearly thirty years ago this Court addressed the question of whether a Utah justice
court defendant could be sentenced more harshly after exercising his right to a de novo
appeal. This Court decided the following:
"[A] person's decision to avail himself of the right to appeal guaranteed
under art. VIII, sec. 9 of the Utah Constitution may not be impaired by
making it conditional on taking the risk of a harsher sentence after the
second trial. Plaintiffs are guaranteed the right to appeal from the justice
court to the district court pursuant to art. VIII, sec. 9 of the Utah
Constitution. They should not be required to take the risk of a longer jail
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sentence in order to exercise that right.
Wisden v. District Court of Sevier County, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984).
The legal concept that "no harsher penalty may result from the second judge,"
became codified in Utah in 1973.
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral
attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a
different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-405 (1973). Then in 1997 the statue was amended to the following:
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set aside.
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or
for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the
prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to the court
at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the
record the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence; or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later
successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which case the defendant and
the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea bargain, conviction,
and sentence had never occurred.
The introduction of subsection (2) into the statute presents a clash between the prior
decisions outlined above and the exceptions identified in (2)(a) and (2)(b) from the 1997
amendment. The court of appeals decision in Vorher v. Henriod denied his request for
emergency relief based on subsection (2)(b) claiming that because he entered a plea in the
justice court he invalidated his conviction and sentence when he appealed that decision to
the district court. Mr. Vorher's case requires a decision from this Court whether the court
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of appeals erred in denying his request for extraordinary relief challenging the imposition
of a more severe penalty following a de novo trial on appeal of his justice court guilty plea.
Mr. Vorher insists that the court of appeals did err in deciding that his district court
sentence, which increased his jail time by 90 days and his fine by $ 800.00, was not a
violation of his appellate rights and rights to due process. He asks this Court to grant him
the relief the court of appeals denied him5 and with its opinion would now deny other
similarly situated justice court defendants by allowing the exception to dissolve the long
standing general rule and by denying him his right to appeal and right to due process.

A. JUSTICE COURTS ARE DIFFERENT
In 2005 this Court reviewed a claim that justice courts in Utah were unconstitutional
because of the appellate rules that permit a defendant to appeal from a judgment of the
justice court and obtain a new trial in district court through a trial de novo while that initial
judgment of guilty from the justice court remains in effect. That claim was addressed and
rejected by this Court in a series of petitions joined on certiorari review in Bernat v.
Allphin, 2005 UT 1.
In ruling that the justice court appellate process did not violate double jeopardy, due
process or equal protection, this Court in Bernat relied on prior United States Supreme
Court and Utah Supreme Court case authority concluding that while different the Utah
justice court system is constitutional. The Court ruled, at least in part, the justice court
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appellate system in constitutional because it provides more process than less process to
Utah's justice court appellants. Id.
Specifically, this Court expressed that one of the additional processes due to Utah
defendants appealing their justice court convictions is the inability of the de novo district
court judge to sentence more harshly if convicted at the de novo trial. In Bernat this Court
stated:

A de novo trial is no less "anew," "afresh," or "a complete retrial upon new
evidence" simply because it functions as a form of appellate review. The state
bears the same burden of establishing a defendant's guilt in a trial de novo as it
would had the case originated there, and a defendant is afforded a clean slate upon
which to relitigate the facts as to his guilt or innocence. The outcome of the prior
justice court proceeding plays no part in the trial de novo, except that a district
court is prohibited from imposing a harsher sentence than that imposed by the
justice court.^
f 32 Moreover, we reject the contention that a trial de novo cannot be considered
on par with more traditional appeals simply because it differs in form. Justice
courts "are designed, in the interest of both the defendant and the [s]tate, to
provide speedier and less costly adjudications than may be possible in criminal
courts of general jurisdiction." Cohen, 407 U.S. at 114. Due to this difference in
design, it stands to reason that the differences between justice courts and district
courts would necessitate different forms of appellate review. Because Utah justice
courts are not "courts of record," it is not only constitutionally permissible to allow
a defendant the opportunity to relitigate his or her case anew, but practically and
reasonably sound.
12. In this respect, our observation that an appeal from a justice court
requires a de novo trial to proceed "as if it originated there," Pledger,
626 P.2d at 416 (internal quotation omitted), is, in the strictest sense,
incorrect, given that a district court cannot impose a greater sentence
than the sentence imposed in the justice court proceeding, Wisden, 694
P.2d at 605-06.
Bernat, 2005 Utah 1, Iff 31-32, n.12 (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals decision relied on what it referred to as the "broad exception"
of 76-3-405(2)(b) to defeat his request for relief despite recognizing that the justice court
appeal process is different and that justice court defendants have otherwise lost the right to
appellate review (unless the district court rules on an issue of constitutionality of a statute
or ordinance). Vorher, 2011 UT App. 199, ^ 12. Noteworthy, the appellate court
conceded that the amendment to the statute was drafted without specific consideration of
the practical differences between justice court appeals and district court appeals. The court
of appeals stated:

We recognize that, in a strict sense. Vorher and others who vacate their plea
agreements injustice court by requesting a trial de novo in district court do not
"stand in the same position as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence
had never occurred," see id., because they have lost the right to appellate review.
See id. § 78A-7-118(8) (Supp.2010) ("The decision of the district court is final
and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance."). However, we are not convinced that the legislature
intended to exclude justice court plea agreements from section 76-3-405(2) (b) fs
exception to the general rule against increased punishment following appeals.
Rather, it appears that section 76-3-405 was intended to cover all criminal
appeals but was drafted without specific consideration of the practical
differences between justice court appeals and district court appeals.4. The Utah Supreme Court has applied section 76-3-405 to justice court
appeals even though the statutory language is in some ways inconsistent
with the justice court appeal process. See Wisden v. District Court, 694
P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (applying section 76-3-405(1) to a
trial de novo following an appeal from the justice court, despite the statute's
language limiting its application to situations where a conviction was set
aside on direct review or on collateral attack). Compare State v. Powell,
957 P .2d 595, 596-97 (Utah 1998) (holding that the successful withdrawal
of a guilty plea, even after appeal, does not constitute the setting aside of a
conviction on direct review or collateral attack).
Vorher, 2011 UT App 199,1f 12, n. 4 (emphasis added).
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B. THE COURT OF APPEALS CONCLUSION THAT -405(2)(b)
IS APPLICABLE TO JUSTICE COURT DEFENDANTS VIOLATES
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO APPEAL AND DUE PROCESS

Notably, footnote 4, quoted above indicates that this Court has applied 76-3-405 to
justice court appeals despite its recognition of the differences of the justice court process.
For support of its conclusion the court of appeals relied on Wisden and Powell. Neither
case, however, justifies the court's conclusion.
Wisden is a case that started in the justice court and following a conviction there the
brothers appealed to the district court for a de novo trial. The district court found the
brothers guilty and then sentenced them more harshly than the justice court had sentenced.
Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984). Wisden supports the premise that
this Court relied on authority including 76-3-405, to require reversing the second sentence
and requiring a resentencing no harsher than the justice court imposed. Id. at 606. This
Court expressly noted the basis of its decision.
Our rule is not confined to the statutory limitation, however. In State v. Sorensen,
supra, this Court followed due process requirements enunciated in North
Carolina v. Pearce395 U.S. 71L 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), in ruling
that a defendant should be freed of the apprehension of a more severe sentence as
a retaliation for exercising his right of appeal. In Chess v. Smith, supra, we held
that a person's decision to avail himself of the right to appeal guaranteed under
art. VIII, sec. 9 of the Utah Constitution may not be impaired by making it
conditional on taking the risk of a harsher sentence after the second trial. Plaintiffs
are guaranteed the right to appeal from the justice court to the district court
pursuant to art. VIII, sec. 9 of the Utah Constitution. They should not be required
to take the risk of a longer jail sentence in order to exercise that right.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

Wisden, 694 P.2d at 606 (emphasis added). Importantly, the court's reliance on the
constitutional premises have more weight than does the statutory reference—which does
not include subsection (2)(b) in any form as it was not yet a part of the statute.
Likewise, the court of appeals' reliance on Powell to support the (2)(b) application
on Mr. Vorher also is misplaced. Powell began in the district court and following a
guilty plea he moved to withdraw his plea. After withdrawing his plea he went to trial
and was convicted of a greater crime and then sentenced to more than the first sentence.
Powell 957 P.2d at 595-96. This Court discussed 76-3-405 but found it not to apply to
the situation where Powell had withdrawn his plea. Id. at 596. This Court nonetheless
discussed the purpose of 76-3-405 as follows:
The purpose behind th[is] provision[ ] [section 76-3-405] is to prevent the chilling
effect on the constitutional right to appeal which the possibility of a harsher
sentence would have on a defendant who might be able to demonstrate
reversible error in his conviction.'' Id. at 88. In that case, we held that section 763-405 does not apply to a correction of an illegal sentence because M[t]he
correction of an illegal sentence stands on a different footing than the correction of
an error in a conviction." Id. This is so, in part, because "a defendant is not likely
to appeal a sentence that is unlawfully lenient, and there is, therefore, minimal
chilling effect on the right to appeal." Id.
Powell 957 P.2d at 597 (emphasis added; quoting State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86 (Utah
1991)). Again, the basis for the reversal here was the inapplicability of 76-3-405 with an
explanation of the important purpose of the statute to protect the right to appeal and not
chill nor discourage that right. Id. Once again the (2)(b) subsection was not involved to
support the decision of the court because still not in existence. Subsection (2)(b) is not
the general rule but only an exception to that rule. It should not be permitted to
overshadow the longstanding rule.
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C. COMPELLING AUTHORITY SUPPORTS THAT -405(2)(b)
SHOULD NOT IMPACT JUSTICE COURT DEFENDANTS

Contrary to the court of appeals' decision in Vorher, the decisions of this Court and
even a number of cases from the court of appeals support that the strong purpose to protect
a defendant's rights to due process and his right to appeal significantly dismisses the court
of appeals' reliance on (2)(b) supports this Court's decision to provide relief to Mr. Vorher.
The court of appeals' decision to apply subsection (2)(b) to the justice court context
is contrary to Bernat's expression of the long held rule from subsection (1) and how the
justice court appellate process has operated and continues to operate despite the subsection
(2)(b) amendment in 1997. A review of the history, purpose and implementation of the
general rule's application to justice courts is worthy of review here.
Precisely because of the difference between the justice court appellate process and
the district court process (de novo trial versus appellate court review of the record), this
Court has consistently reviewed the justice court appellate process to disallow a more
severe sentence at the de novo stage sentencing than the justice court sentence. The court
of appeals decision in Vorher disregarded that history of justice court appellate review
process finding that the exception in subsection 2(b) of 76-3-405 was also meant to cover
justice court appeals.
This Court made clear in State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), that the purpose
behind the prohibition for sentencing more harshly in the second sentencing, codified at
76-3-405 in its original form and still present as the general rule and not the exception,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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since the addition of subsection (2)(b), is to prevent the chilling effect of the possibility or a
harsher or more severe sentence on the constitutional right to appeal where one might get a
better decision. That blanket rule without exception was pronounced in Wisden v. District
Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984), specific to the justice court scenario with reliance on
protection of constitutional safeguards as discussed earlier. Wisden has been discussed
previously.
Notably, in Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980), this Court found that a
lawyer who had advised his client to forgo his appeal because he could receive a much
harsher or severe sentence on retrial was found to be a misstatement of the law and
justified reversal. Both the constitutional right to appeal and due process supported this
decision.
In Taylorsville City v. Adkins, a case that began in the justice courts and was
appealed to the district court where the City desired to re-prosecute companion counts
which had resulted in acquittals at the justice court, the court of appeals relied on the
constitutional right to appeal, under art. VIII, sec. 9 of the Utah Constitution, Wisden and
the purpose of 76-3-405 to explain the ruling. The court of appeals stated:

In reaching its conclusion, the Wisden court also determined that a person's
decision to avail himself of the right to appeal guaranteed under art. VIII, sec. 9 of
the Utah Constitution may not be impaired by making it conditional on taking the
risk of a harsher sentence after the second trial. Plaintiffs are guaranteed the right
to appeal from the justice court to the district court pursuant to art. VIII, sec. 9 of
the Utah Constitution. They should not be required to take the risk of a longer jail
sentence in order to exercise that right.
Id. The court's reasoning in Wisden is equally applicable here. If we were to adopt
the reasoning set forth by Taylorsville, a person who was convicted of one charge
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injustice court, but acquitted of others, would be forced into a Hobbesian choice.
On the one hand, if he chooses to appeal the conviction he would risk being
convicted of charges of which he was previously acquitted. On the other hand, if
he chooses not to exercise his constitutional right to appeal, he would be forced to
live with a conviction that may not be just. A person's right to an appeal may not
by impaired in such a way.
Taylorsville City v. Adkins, 145 P.3d 1161 (UT App 2006). The same dilemma exists
for the justice court defendant.
In State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, the court of appeals found that even an
increase in the amount of fine imposed at the second sentence was in violation of the rule
against no harsher or more sever sentencing.
The court of appeals also concluded in a 2002 opinion that prosecutors did not
overcome the presumption of vindictiveness and the chilled effect on appeal when adding
a restitution amount to the sentence. The court of appeals indicated that "the second
sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the number of elements or in
their magnitude." State v. Samora, 2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 64.
Notably, the court of appeals decision in Vorher did not address this issue of
presumed vindictiveness and the chilling effect on Mr. Vorher. Given the colloquy
provided herein at the district court sentencing, the presumption of vindictiveness for
pursuing an appeal should have been addressed by the court of appeals in reaching its
decision.
The cases presented above demonstrate a consistent approach to the general rule
prohibiting a more severe sentence at the second stage of the justice court process.
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D. NO DISTINCTION EXISTS BETWEEN THE PROTECTION
AFFORDED JUSTICE COURT DEFENDANTS WHETHER
AFTER A PLEA OR FOLLOWING A TRIAL

Importantly, no difference is, or ought to be, recognized in the justice court
appellate context differentiating between whether a person tries the case injustice court
and then seeks de novo review or if they simply plead guilty and then pursue the de novo
appeal. The purpose of the general rule recognized in North Carolina v. Pearce remains
the same—to protect against violations of due process and safeguarding appellate rights.
The Pearce standard expressly forbids actions which chill the right to appeal by disallowing
a more severe sentence at the second trial. State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah
198Inciting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)).
Pearce did not recognize a distinction between the guilty plea and the trial; neither
should this Court given the many reasons a defendant might have to exercise his right to
appellate process of the justice courts and the option of de novo review in the district court.
The rules themselves do not limit a justice court defendant from appealing to the
district court following a plea. Basic fundamental fairness allows justice court defendants
the right to have a guaranty of a law trained judge who has been selected by the governor
and approved by the senate, a jury trial in court of record and all the other companion
rights that attach to the district court. Accompanying these rights, since well before Bernat
but strongly reiterated there, is the right to not be sentenced any more harshly in the district
court than had occurred in the justice court.
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For example, in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court examined the two-tiered appellate process of Kentucky and noted that
whether a trial occurred in the justice court or a plea occurred there, no significance
attached to the right to de novo review.
Kentucky, like many other States, has a two-tier system for adjudicating less
serious criminal cases. In Kentucky, at the option of the arresting officer, those
crimes classified under state law as misdemeanors may be charged and tried in a
so-called inferior court, where, as in the normal trial setting, a defendant may
choose to have a trial or to plead guilty. If convicted after trial or on a guilty plea,
however, he has a right to a trial de novo in a court of general criminal
jurisdiction, so long as he applies within the statutory time. The right to a new
trial is absolute.
Kentucky v. Colten, 407 U.S. at 112-13 (emphasis added; citations omitted). Later that
Court further explained:
We are not persuaded, however, that the Kentucky arrangement for dealing with
the less serious offenses disadvantages defendants any more or any less than trials
conducted in a court of general jurisdiction in the first instance, as long as the
latter are always available. Proceedings in the inferior courts are simple and
speedy, and, if the results in Cohen's case are any evidence, the penalty is not
characteristically severe. Such proceedings offer a defendant the opportunity to
learn about the prosecution fs case and, if he chooses, he need not reveal his
own. He may also plead guilty without a trial and promptly secure a de novo
trial in a court of general criminal jurisdiction.
Cohen, 407 U.S. at 118-19 (emphasis added).
The court of appeals has itself rendered an opinion making very clear that a
defendant who enters a plea agreement and is sentenced in the justice court nonetheless
maintains his/her right to appeal to the district court for de novo review. State v. Hinson,
966 P.2d 273 (UT App 1998). Hinson is instructive because the court of appeals
performed the analysis there they failed to do here by examining the difference within the
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justice court appellate process. The Hinsons, Cynthia and David, were charged injustice
court with possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia. They entered guilty
pleas injustice court and were sentenced. Similar to Mr. Vorher they then obtained a
new lawyer to pursue the de novo appeal to district court.
In district court the State relying on statute 78-5-120 urged the court to dismiss the
appeal because the Hinsons had pleaded guilty injustice court. The State also argued
based on statutory construction of the motion to withdraw requirements that the Hinsons
would have to move to withdraw their pleas before appealing to the district court. The
appellate court made several observations and importantly noted critical distinctions in
the operation and practical application of the appellate processes of justice court and the
so called "conventional" appeal of a case originating in the district court. The Hinson
court stated:
The State argues that the language in section 78-5-120, "whether rendered by
default or after trial," limits a defendant in the justice court to a trial de novo in the
district court to when he or she was found guilty by way of a default judgment, or
by a guilty verdict after a trial. We do not read section 78-5-120 so narrowly. The
language relied upon by the State is a dependent clause setting out a range of
circumstances within which a judgment could result from justice court
proceedings, but it does not preclude a defendant from appealing other judgments.
The operative language provides that ,?[a]ny person not satisfied with a judgment
rendered in a justice court.... is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp. 1997).

Moreover, to preclude the right of appeal after a guilty plea would require a person
to submit to a trial or lose that right.. When the constitutional right to appeal a
judgment is satisfied by a trial de novo, it is illogical to require either the state or
defendant to actually try the case as a prerequisite to the appeal. Additionally,
because the justice court is not a court of record, the "appeal" does not involve a
review of the justice court proceedings which result in a judgment.
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This notwithstanding, the State argues further that before a defendant can appeal
his or her guilty plea entered in the justice court to the district court, the defendant
must first make a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Otherwise, the State
maintains, there is nothing for the district court to review.
In a conventional appeal environment, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
required to ngiv[e] the court who took the plea the first chance to consider
defendant's arguments." Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
However, that underlying rationale has noplace in an appeal from a justice
court judgment on guilty pleas precisely because there is no record to review and
the constitutional right to appeal from judgments of a justice court is satisfied by
a trial de novo, upon the merits, without regard to the judgment entered in the
justice court. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5; Utah Code
Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp.1997); Utah R.Crim. P. 26(12)(a); City ofMonticello, 788
P.2d at 519. By appealing, the justice court judgment is stayed pursuant to Rule 4608 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The district court is not confined
to the record before the justice court and need not defer to the justice court's
findings and determinations. The district court neither reverses nor affirms the
judgment of the justice court, but renders a new, distinct, and independent
judgment. Accordingly, because the proceedings begin anew in the district court, a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea would be superfluous and is thus not required.
We therefore hold that a defendant may appeal to the district court a judgment of
conviction on a guilty plea entered voluntarily in the justice court.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 275-76 (emphasis added; citations in original).
The court of appeals erroneously concluded the applicability of-405(2)(b) to the
justice court analysis. For justice court defendants, no distinction can be made
differentiating between a plea and a trial verdict of guilty—both are convictions which
carry and absolute right to appeal.
E. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRE REVERSING THE
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AS IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE IN THE JUSTICE COURTS.

In relying on the exception to the general rule contained in Utah Code Ann. -405,
the court of appeals first labeled the exception as a broad exception but then later
21
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concluded that Mr. Vorher's appeal or request for a trial de novo "invalidated the justice
court conviction." Vorher, at ^f 11. That conclusion is contrary to this Court's explanation
of the justice court to district court de novo process.
The plain language of the exception itself is difficult to shoehorn into Utah's justice
court de novo process as approved by this Court in Bernat. The exception relied on by the
court appeals is -405(2)(b) which reads as follows:
(2) This section does not apply when:
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later successfully
moves to invalidate his conviction, in which case the defendant and the prosecution stand
in the same position as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never
occurred.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405. The language "invalidating his conviction" is inconsistent
with this Court's recognition of the continuing jeopardy of convictions from justice courts
and the rejection of double jeopardy arguments urged in Bernat.
Further, the court of appeals also incorrectly concluded that the exception applied to
Mr. Vorher because he had entered a plea in the justice court finding no reason to reject the
exception to a justice court de novo review. The court of appeals incorrectly concluded as
follows:
We recognize that, in a strict sense, Vorher and others who vacate their plea
agreements injustice court by requesting a trial de novo in district court do not
"stand in the same position as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence
had never occurred," see id, because they have lost the right to appellate review.
See id § 78A-7-118(8) (Supp.2010) ("The decision of the district court is final
and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance."). However, we are not convinced that the legislature
intended to exclude justice court plea agreements from section 76-3-405(2)(b)'s
exception to the general rule against increased punishment following appeals.
Rather, it appears that section 76-3-405 was intended to cover all criminal
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appeals but was drafted without specific consideration of the practical
differences between justice court appeals and district court appeals.
Vorher at ^f 12 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
These conclusions of the court of appeals are contrary to carefully crafted reasoning
of this Court distinguishing how our two-tiered justice court system maintained
constitutional attack from double jeopardy, due process and equal protection grounds. The
court's reliance on the subsection (2)(b) exception ignores the Bernat analysis and previous
conclusions and expressions of this Court.
Moreover, the public policy concerns expressed by the court of appeals are incorrect
and require this Court to evaluate and correct the decision of the court of appeals. Our
criminal process has long recognized a practical and common sense approach to
jurisprudence, particularly when considering issues of judicial economy. In State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 937, 938-939 (Utah App 1988), practical considerations approved allowing the
defendant whose motion to suppress was denied in district court to enter a conditional plea
there and then appeal the trial court's decision. That decision obviated the need for a trial
in district court to preserve the right to appeal the denial of the pre-trial motion. Sery has
expedited cases through our process efficiently and without need for extra time consuming
and costly trials. Notably, this Court has previously ruled that a defendant who pleads in
justice court is still entitled to the de novo appellate process. State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273
(Utah 1988).
The court of appeals decision herein requires this Court to evaluate under its
supervisory powers the practical effect of the decision of the court of appeals which would
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have the (2)(b) exception to -405 to swallow the rule and require all defendants who want
to have a trial before a district court judge necessarily to have a trial in the justice court
first. Such a decision would be completely burden and chill the appellate rights of an
enormous number of justice court defendants impacting on their expenses for litigation, the
consumption of time for them and the prosecutors' offices and courts alike.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the court of appeals in this case is not in harmony with the
constitutionally protected rights to appeal, rights to due process, Bernat and long standing
rulings by our Supreme Court and court of appeals referenced above. The decision of the
court of appeals recognizes the differences in appealing from justice court to district court
as compared to a district court appeal to the appellate courts in Utah. Section 405(2)(b)
should not apply in the justice court appellate process and to the extent it does it violates
constitutional rights of the justice court defendant.
For any or all reasons urged above, this Court should grant Mr. Vorher and the
unknown many of justice court defendants similarly^ituated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ / dayj>£Mqrch, 2012.

lARD G. UDAY
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellg
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VORHERv.HENRIOD
Carlos VORHER, Petitioner, v. Honorable Stephen HENRIOD, Respondent
No. 20100573-CA.
- J u n e 23, 2011
Before Judges ORME? THORNE5 and VOROS.
Charles R. Stewart, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.M. Douglas Bayly, Tooele; and Brent
M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Respondent.
OPINION
Tf 1 Carlos Vorher petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 65B(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to vacate a criminal sentence imposed by the district
court.1 See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d) (governing the availability of extraordinary
relief to remedy the wrongful use of judicial authority). Vorher was originally charged in
justice court with class B misdemeanor voyeurism. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of class C misdemeanor disorderly conduct and was
sentenced to ninety days in jail. Vorher then exercised his right to a trial de novo in the
district court, where he was charged with and convicted of the original voyeurism charge
and sentenced to 180 days in jail. Vorher argues that Utah Code section 76-3-405
prohibits the district court's sentence from exceeding the ninety-day sentence imposed by
the justice court. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (2008) (limiting the
imposition of increased sentences after successful appeal). We decline to grant Vorher's
petition for extraordinary relief.

BACKGROUND
f 2 On March 18, 2009, at about 5:20 a.m., a witness observed a man lying on his
stomach in the grass outside a residence in Tooele, Utah. The man appeared to be peering
into a basement window of the residence. As the witness approached, the man got up and
walked away. The witness noted the license plate number of the man's vehicle and
reported the incident to police. The vehicle was registered to Vorher.
Tf 3 The investigating officer went to Vorher's house and spoke with his wife, who
advised the officer that Vorher had left the house for work that morning about 6:00 a.m.
Vorher's wife did not know if he had left the house any earlier. The officer also spoke
with M.N., who lived in the residence where the peeping had allegedly occurred. M.N.
told the officer that her teenage daughter, K.B., occupied a basement room on the side of
the house where the man had been observed and that at 5:20 a.m. K.B. would have been
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dressing and preparing for school. The officer also met with Vorher, who invoked his
right to an attorney and apparently made no statement. The officer concluded his
investigation and referred the matter to the Tooele City Attorney, who subsequently filed
a class B misdemeanor voyeurism charge against Vorher in Tooele County's justice court.
Tf 4 On December 14, 2009, Vorher pleaded guilty injustice court to a reduced charge of
class C misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Although there is no formal plea agreement in
the record, it appears that Vorher's guilty plea resulted from a plea bargain or agreement
whereby Vorher agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a reduction in the charge against
himr The justice court sentenced Vorher to pay a fine and serve ninety days in jail. On
December 21, Vorher reported to jail as ordered but also filed an appeal of his conviction
to the district court pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-7-118. Shortly thereafter, Vorher
was released from jail and the matter was transferred to district court for a trial de novo.
f 5 On April 23, 2010, the district court conducted a jury trial at which Vorher was
convicted on the original charge of class B misdemeanor voyeurism. Vorher was placed
into custody pending sentencing, which occurred on May 25. The district court sentenced
Vorher to 180 days in jail with credit for forty-one days already served. At this point, the
following colloquy occurred:
[Vorher's counsel]: Your Honor, it would be our—
[The district court]: He can serve—
[Vorher's counsel]:—our position that because he was sentenced to 90 days that the
maximum amount this Court can sentence him to is 90 days.
[The district court]: Because he got a deal in the justice court and rejected it and came
back up here on a B, he doesn't get the 90 days. He gets the whole 180 days.
[Vorher's counsel]: I think there's contrary case law, if I can speak to that, your Honor.
[The district court]: Go ahead and appeal.
The district court also assessed a fine and surcharge against Vorher. Vorher now asks this
court to grant him extraordinary relief in the form of vacating the district court's sentence
and remanding for a new sentence not to exceed that originally imposed by the justice
court.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
U 6 Vorher's petition for extraordinary relief argues that, pursuant to Utah Code section
76-3-405, the district court's sentence after trial de novo cannot exceed the sentence
originally imposed by the justice court. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1)
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(2008) ("Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a
different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior
sentence."). Accordingly, Vorher asks this court to vacate the district court's sentence
and remand the matter to the district court for entry of a new sentence that is no more
harsh than Vorher's sentence in the justice court.
f 7 This court is granted broad discretion in reviewing a petition for extraordinary relief
under rule 65B(d). See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,ffif23-26, 127 P.3d 682. "Unlike a
party filing a direct appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief has no
right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's mishandling of a particular case."
Id. Tj 23. "Rather, whether relief is ultimately granted is left to the sound discretion of the
court hearing the petition." Id. Thus, even a petitioner who can establish grounds for
relief-in this case, an alleged abuse of discretion by the district court, see Utah R. Civ. P.
65B(d)(2)(A)-has no right to such relief and the reviewing court retains the discretion to
deny the petition.- See Barrett, 2005 UT 88, If 24. "In sum, if a petitioner is able to
establish that a lower court abused its discretion, that petitioner becomes eligible for, but
not entitled to, extraordinary relief." Id.
ANALYSIS
Tf 8 Vorher seeks extraordinary relief from his district court sentence pursuant to rule
65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d).
Vorher has no direct right to appeal his sentence because the district court did not rule on
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-118(8)
(Supp.2010) ("The decision of the district court [on appeal from the justice court] is final
and may not be appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute
or ordinance."). Accordingly, Vorher has "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy,"
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), and his " 'pursuit of an extraordinary writ is procedurally
correct,' " Taylorsville City v. Adkins, 2006 UT App 374, % 3, 145 P.3d 1161 (per
curiam) (quoting Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App 50, f 8, 975 P.2d 946).
Tf 9 However, we conclude that Vorher is not eligible for extraordinary relief because he
has not established an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Vorher
correctly asserts that Utah Code section 76-3-405(1) generally prohibits the imposition
of a greater sentence after a defendant successfully appeals. See generally Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-405(1). However, this case falls outside of the general rule because Vorher's
original conviction and sentence resulted from a plea agreement. See generally id. § 763-405(2)(b). Thus, while a mistake of law "may constitute an abuse of discretion,"
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ^f 26, there was no mistake of law here because section 76-3405(1 )'s prohibition on increased sentences does not apply when the original sentence
results from a plea agreement that is later repudiated.
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Tf 10 Utah Code section 76-3-405 provides that, upon a defendant's reconviction after a
successful appeal, the sentencing court "shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than
the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-405(1). And, section 76-3-405 has been held to govern appeals from the
justice court to the district court. See Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah
1984) (per curiam) ("[T]he district court sentences were contrary to section 76-3-405.");
Adkins, 2006 UT App 374, ^ 12 ("The Wisden court concluded that Utah Code section
76-3-405(1) applied to justice court defendants."). Thus, Vorher is correct in his
assertion that the punishment imposed by the district court following a trial de novo
cannot ordinarily exceed that originally imposed by the justice court for an offense or
offenses based on the same conduct. See Wisden, 694 P.2d at 606.
TJ11 However, section 76-3-405 contains a broad exception for situations where the
original sentence is the result of a plea agreement: "This section does not apply when . a
defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later successfully moves
to invalidate his conviction, in which case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the
same position as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(b) (2008). Vorher's justice court conviction resulted from
a plea agreement whereby Vorher pleaded guilty to a reduced charge, and his appeal to
the district court invalidated the justice court conviction. Under these circumstances,
section 76-3-405's prohibition on increased sentences "does not apply." See id.
^f 12 We recognize that, in a strict sense, Vorher and others who vacate their plea
agreements injustice court by requesting a trial de novo in district court do not "stand in
the same position as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never
occurred," see id., because they have lost the right to appellate review. See id. § 78A-7118(8) (Supp.2010) ("The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed
unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.").
However, we are not convinced that the legislature intended to exclude justice court plea
agreements from section 76-3-405(2)(b)fs exception to the general rule against increased
punishment following appeals. Rather, it appears that section 76-3-405 was intended to
cover all criminal appeals but was drafted without specific consideration of the practical
differences between justice court appeals and district court appeals.<|j 13 Our decision today that the exception contained in Utah Code section 76-3405(2)(b) applies to justice court plea agreements invalidated by appeals to the district
court is informed by the policies expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in addressing
situations in which a district court defendant successfully withdraws a guilty plea. That
court has stated,
We also believe that it would be unwise to hold that a sentence imposed pursuant to a
plea agreement should limit a sentence subsequently imposed at trial after defendant has
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withdrawn his plea. Plea bargains are entered into so that both sides may avoid the
expense and uncertainty of a trial. In exchange for conserving State resources, defendant
usually receives a lower charge or lesser sentence. Thus, it would be anomalous to allow
a defendant to keep the benefit of an agreement he repudiated while requiring the State to
proceed to trial and prove its case.
State v. Powell, 957 P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d 598,
600 (Utah 1998) (stating that exclusion of withdrawn plea agreements from rule against
greater subsequent sentences "advances public policy by preventing a defendant from
retaining the benefits of a plea bargain while rescinding his part of the agreement"). Here,
Vorher seeks to retain the benefit of his original plea agreement "while rescinding his
part of the agreement," Maguire, 957 P.2d at 600, a result that would clearly run contrary
to the public policies surrounding plea agreements.CONCLUSION
Tf 14 We conclude that the district court made no mistake of law and did not exceed its
permitted discretion when it sentenced Vorher to 180 days in jail on his class B
misdemeanor voyeurism conviction. Although Utah Code section 76-3-405(1) prohibits
the imposition of a more severe sentence after a successful appeal, section 76-3405(2)(b) creates an exception to the general rule for cases such as Vorher's, where "a
defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later successfully moves
to invalidate his conviction," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(b). Accordingly, Vorher
has not demonstrated that he is eligible for the extraordinary relief that he seeks, and his
petition for extraordinary relief is denied.
FOOTNOTES
L Tooele City filed an opposition memorandum to Vorher's petition as the real party in
interest to this controversy. The named respondent, the Honorable Steven L. Henriod,
filed a notice in this court agreeing that Tooele City is in the best position to litigate
Vorher's petition.
2. In its memorandum opposing Vorher's petition, Tooele City additionally asserts thai
Vorher's plea agreement in the justice court included terms providing that the prosecutor
would not make a sentencing recommendation regarding jail time and that Vorher would
not appeal his conviction to the district court. These assertions are not inconsistent with
the record before us, but neither does the record establish that these terms were a part of
Vorher's plea agreement. Accordingly, we do not rely on these assertions in our analysis
of Vorher's petition.
3. Once a petitioner has demonstrated that he is eligible for extraordinary relief, the
reviewing court "will consider multiple factors when determining whether or not to grant
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the relief requested." State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88? If 24, 127 P.3d 682. Such factors
include "the egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the legal issue
presented by the petition, the severity of the consequences occasioned by the alleged
error, and additional factors." Id.
4. The Utah Supreme Court has applied section 76-3-405 to justice court appeals even
though the statutory language is in some ways inconsistent with the justice court appeal
process. See Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)
(applying section 76-3-405(1) to a trial de novo following an appeal from the justice
court, despite the statute's language limiting its application to situations where a
conviction was set aside on direct review or on collateral attack). Compare State v.
Powell, 957 P .2d 595, 596-97 (Utah 1998) (holding that the successful withdrawal of a
guilty plea, even after appeal, does not constitute the setting aside of a conviction on
direct review or collateral attack).
5. We also note the possibility that prosecutors might be less willing to entertain justice
court plea agreements at all if defendants could lock in their maximum sentence with a
plea agreement and then demand a trial de novo in the district court.
THORNE, Judge:
K 15 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., Judges.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Addendum B

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

Carlos Vorher,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20110737-SC

Honorable Stephen Henriod,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on August 25, 2011.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue.
Whether the court of appeals erred in denying Petitioner's
request for extraordinary relief challenging the imposition of a more
severe penalty following a de novo trial on appeal of his justice court
guilty plea.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter.

For The Court:

Dated

H'K-H
_f

_
fatthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice
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UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Article VIII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — Right
of appeal.]

The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The
district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in
all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
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76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set aside.
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or
for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the
prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to the court at
the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the record
the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence; or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later
successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which case the defendant and
the prosecution stand in the same position as though the plea bargain, conviction,
and sentence had never occurred.

Amended by Chapter 291, 1997 General Session
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78A-7-118. Appeals from justice court - Trial or hearing de novo in district court.
(1) In a criminal case, a defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court only if
the defendant files a notice of appeal within 30 days of:
(a) sentencing after a bench or jury trial, or a plea of guilty in the justice court resulting in
a finding or verdict of guilt; or
(b) a plea of guilty in the justice court that is held in abeyance.
(2) If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered pursuant to negotiation with the
prosecutor, and the defendant did not reserve the right to appeal as part of the plea
negotiation, the negotiation is voided by the appeal.
(3) A defendant convicted and sentenced injustice court is entitled to a hearing de novo
in the district court on the following matters, if the defendant files a notice of appeal
within 30 days of:
(a) an order revoking probation;
(b) an order entering a judgment of guilt pursuant to the person's failure to fulfil the terms
of a plea in abeyance agreement;
(c) a sentence entered pursuant to Subsection (3)(b); or
(d) an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea.
(4) The prosecutor is entitled to a hearing de novo in the district court on:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial
of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment holding invalid any part of a statute or ordinance;
(e) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the prosecutor certifies that exclusion of
that evidence prevents continued prosecution of an infraction or class C misdemeanor;
(f) a pretrial order excluding evidence, when the prosecutor certifies that exclusion of that
evidence impairs continued prosecution of a class B misdemeanor; or
(g) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.
(5) A notice of appeal for a hearing de novo in the district court on a pretrial order
excluding evidence under Subsection (4)(e) or (f) shall be filed within 30 days of the
order excluding the evidence.
(6) Upon entering a decision in a hearing de novo, the district court shall remand the case
to the justice court unless:
(a) the decision results in immediate dismissal of the case;
(b) with agreement of the parties, the district court consents to retain jurisdiction; or
(c) the defendant enters a plea of guilty in the district court.
(7) The district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case on trial de novo.
(8) The decision of the district court is final and may not be appealed unless the district
court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.

Amended by Chapter 215, 2010 General Session
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78A-5-102. Jurisdiction — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the
Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to carry
into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the rules
of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court prior to
July 1,1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction over judgments and orders of the justice court as
outlined in Section 78A-7-118 and small claims appeals filed pursuant to Section 78A-8-106.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under Sections
78A-3-102and78A-4-103.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in class B
misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed, or has not formed and then dissolved,
a justice court; or
(c) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal episode alleging
the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
(9) If the district court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (5) or (8), it also has
jurisdiction over offenses listed in Section 78A-7-106 even if those offenses are committed by a
person 16 years of age or older.
(10) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Child
Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district court.

Amended by Chapter 34, 2010 General Session
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